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Abstract. A brief historical perspective is first given concerning financial crashes,
- from the 17th till the 20th century. In modern times, it seems that log periodic
oscillations are found before crashes in several financial indices. The same is found in
sand pile avalanches on Sierpinski gaskets. A discussion pertains to the after shock
period with illustrations from the DAX index. The factual financial observations
and the laboratory ones allow us some conjecture on symptoms and remedies for
discussing financial crashes along econophysics lines.
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1 Introduction
Because of its magnitude, the stock market crash of Oct. 19, 1987 outshines
all downturns ever observed in the past. In one day, the Dow Jones lost 21.6 %
and the worst decline reached 45.8 % in Hong Kong. By comparison, with the
most famous crash of 1929, the crash was spread over 2 days: The Dow Jones
sank 12.8 % on October 28 and 11.7 % the following day. This shows that a
stock market index decline does not necessarily lead to a crash in one single
day. The decline can be slow and last several days or even several months in
what would be called not so drastic cases, but a long duration bear market.
Notice that markets had been using breakers or periods of trading halts and
limitations of daily variations in order to avoid anomalous drops. However,
Lauterbach and Ben-Zion [1] found that trading halts and price limits had
no impact on the overall decline of October 1987.
Such financial factual observations should be turned into quantitative
measures. That is why we looked at the similarities between index evolution
in 87 and 97, as early as spring 97 [2,3]. Previous historically famous crashes
served as a thinking basis, - see Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 it is recalled that log-
periodic corrections are sometimes superimposed on an index trend before
a crash. In Sect. 3 the types of fluctuations in a post-crash period are also
touched upon. Sorting out distinct behaviors should be made a priori, as here
below for the DAX.
Fractal systems provide a good modelling of a wide class of media in par-
ticular those containing a hierarchical structure, like in financial markets [4].
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We conjecture that the Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld (BTW) model [5] of a sand-
pile, generalized for fractal bases contains several ingredients which could
be translated mutatis mutandis into a model for stock market index evolu-
tion because such a model contains log-periodic oscillations as found before
crashes. Results on the BTW model [5] on prefractal Regular Sierpinski Car-
pets (RSC) having various fractal dimensions and connectivity are reported
in Appendix. Since log-periodic corrections characterizing features in the dis-
tribution of sand avalanches depend on the ramification of the RSC, this
allows us to propose reflection lines on remedies against crashes in Sect. 4.
2 Some Historical Notes
Although there might have been financial crises in previous times and loca-
tions all over the world, the most famous one in recent times is the Tulipo-
mania and subsequent crash which occurred in the 17-th century in Holland
[6]. Everything started in 1559 when the first tulip bulb (TB) was brought to
Holland. The flower was considered so rare that speculation ensued and the
flower became wildly overvalued : in 1635, 1 TB was worth 4 tons of wheat +
4 oxen + 8 tons rye + 8 pigs + one bed + 12 sheep + clothes + 2 wine casks
+ 4 tons beer + 2 tons butter + 1000 pounds cheese + 1 silver drinking cup.
In 1637, 1 TB was worth 550 NLG, i.e. a 117 % return/year. However within
1637, in a 6 week time the price of 1 TB went down 90 %. Nowadays a black
tulip bulb costs about 0.5 EUR.
A set of similar financial crises is that made of the Compagnie du Mis-
sissipi [7] and that of the South Sea Company [8,9] bubbles. In 1715, John
Law had persuaded Philippe, Regent of France, to consider a banking scheme
that promised to improve the financial condition of the kingdom. In theory a
private affair, the system was linked from the beginning with liquidating the
national debt. When the monopoly of the Louisiana trade was surrendered in
1717, Law created a trading company known as the Compagnie d’Occident
(or Compagnie du Mississipi) linked to the bank and in which government
bills were accepted for the purchase of shares, Law gaining a monopoly on
all French overseas trade. The result was a huge wave of speculation as the
value of a share went from its initial 500 livre value to 18 000 livres. When
the paper money was presented at the bank in exchange for gold, which was
unavailable, panic ensued, and shares felt by a factor of 2 in a matter of days.
In England, the Whigs invented the Bank of England in 1694. The South
Sea Company (SSC) was formed in 1711 by the Tory government to trade
with Spanish America, and to offset the financial support which the Bank
of England had provided for Whig governments. The Tories had in mind to
establish a system like the Compagnie du Mississipi Monopoly [7], using trad-
ing privileges and monopolies granted to Britain after the Treaty of Utrecht.
In 1720 a Parliament bill was passed enabling persons to whom the govern-
ment owed portions of the national debt to exchange their claims for shares
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in SSC stocks. On March 1 the SSC stocks were valued GBP 175. On June 1,
the shares were valued 500 and more than 1 000 in August 1720. Speculators
took advantage of investors to obtain subscriptions for patently impossible
projects. By September 1720 however, the market had collapsed, and by De-
cember SSC shares were down to 124, dragging other, including government,
stocks with them. Many investors were ruined including I. Newton [10].
In the years from 1925 to 1929 it was almost a craze to play the market
[11]. One could go to a broker and purchase stock on margin. That allowed the
speculation bubble to grow unchecked. Many mini crashes and subsequent
recoveries began as early as Monday March 25, 1929. The summer of 1929 was
not too bad. However on Sept. 3, a bear market became firmly established,
and on Thursday Oct. 24, 1929 a crash occurred. In fact such crashes, not
mentioning the uncontrolled buying frenzy on IPOs stocks at the end of the
1990’s in companies for which owners do not have a coherent business plan,
look all similar : euphoria and speculation.
Other recent summers (rather than octobers!) are in the memory of in-
vestors, e.g. the CAC 40 dropped every summer between 1990 and 1998,
except for 1993 (Table 1). There were 11 declines on the S&P 500 since 1925.
One of these were horrendous (ca. 43 % between Jan. 73 and Sept. 74). In
so doing it can be emphasized that crashes can be very abrupt but a market
drop of the same, and even bigger importance can also occur.
Table 1. The drop in CAC 40 values in the 1990’s. The ”date” is at the start of
the ”drop”, given in % and ∆t is the time interval over which the drop occurred
Year 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
date Aug.02 Aug.18 Jun.02 Aug.30 Aug.21 Jun. 30 Jul.01 Jul.20
drop 20 8 12 12 11 9 10 20
∆t 3 w 3 d 2 m 1 m 1 m 1 m 2 m 1 m
3 Empirical Universality and Symptoms
Bates [12] studied transactions prices of S&P 500 futures options a posteriori
over 1985-1987 to find out expectations/precursors of a shock. He discovered
that out− of −money puts were unusually expensive to out− of −money
calls. Then, the use of a jump-diffusion model for daily options prices of 1987
leaded to the conclusion that an expected negative jump was predictable a
year prior to the crash. Other techniques exist, like those looking at the
probability distribution function of returns [13,14]. The main difference with
our studies [3,15,16], and that of others [17,18,19,20,21,22], comes from the a
priori analysis of the 1990-1997 scenario, trying to find out if a break point in
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an index series becomes more and more probable, how?, and may be why?.
These ideas are controversial [23,24].
3.1 Before: diagnoses
The application of statistical physics ideas to the forecasting of stock market
behavior and crashes has been proposed earlier [15,17,18]. It was proposed
that an economic index y(t) could increase as a complex power law [17], i.e.
y = A+B
(
tc − t
tc
)
−m [
1 + C sin
(
ω ln
(
tc − t
tc
)
+ φ
)]
for t < tc (1)
where tc is the crash-time(day) or rupture point, A, B, m, C, ω and φ are
free parameters, while the period of the oscillations converges to the rupture
point at t = tc. This law is similar to that of critical points at so-called
second order phase transitions [25] but with a complex exponent m+ iω, and
generalizes the scaleless situation discrete scale invariance cases [26,27]. From
the stock market point of view, the equation has been derived Canessa [28]
along renormalization group lines.
The S&P500 data [16] for the period preceding the 1987 October crash
were already fitted using Eq.(1). It has been stressed that a nonlinear param-
eter fit does not easily lead to robust values against small data perturbations
[29], the more so when there are seven parameters. Various values of m,
including negative ones, were in fact reported in the literature for various
indices and events [15,16,30,31,32], and are summarized in Table 2.
It would be nice stipulating that m could be universal by analogy with
second order phase transitions, at least for the presently studied crashes,
seemingly falling into financially similar classes, even though this is surely
an unrealistic dream. A behavior which we considered was the logarithmic
divergence
y = A+B ln
(
tc − t
tc
)[
1 + C sin
(
ω ln
(
tc − t
tc
)
+ φ
)]
for t < tc. (2)
As in critical point data analysis the optimum test consists in separating
the most diverging term from the others, after having eliminated the so called
mean field trend and searching for the correction to scaling [33]. In fact, the
fit can be made in two steps : (i) one looks for a tdivc , i.e. for the logarithmic
divergence; then (ii) for toscc for the oscillation convergence [16].
Due to the log-periodicity in Eq.(2), the relation
toscc =
tn −
tn+1
λ
1− 1
λ
(3)
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Table 2. Values of the coefficients in Eq. (1) that result from fitting different
financial indices to Eq. (1)
Period Index m A B tdivc R
80-87 Dow 0 -499.4±16.1 -532.9±5.6 87.85±0.02 0.951
80-87 Dow 1/3 -526.6±20.8 614.7±8.6 88.22±0.03 0.956
80-87 Dow 1/2 -5.7±15.2 257.8±4.1 88.46±0.04 0.956
80-87 S&P500 0 -57.4±2.5 -68.9±0.9 87.89±0.03 0.947
80-87 S&P500 1/3 -80.3±3.7 88.2±1.6 88.45±0.04 0.949
80-87 S&P500 1/2 -11.6±2.8 38.8±0.8 88.78±0.05 0.949
80-87 FTSE 0 -563.5±31.9 -512.9±9.8 87.85±0.03 0.960
80-87 FTSE 1/3 -449.9±41.4 549.9±15.1 88.21±0.05 0.958
80-87 FTSE 1/2 59.1±31.5 222.3±7.1 88.41±0.06 0.956
90-97 Dow 0 -1919.6±38 -1762±13.4 97.92±0.02 0.978
90-97 Dow 1/3 -2100.4±49 2081.8±20.3 98.39±0.03 0.982
90-97 Dow 1/2 -360.1±35.8 882±9.7 98.68±0.04 0.982
90-97 S&P500 0 -141.5±4.4 -187±1.5 97.90±0.02 0.974
90-97 S&P500 1/3 -161.4±6.1 221.3±2.5 98.38±0.03 0.976
90-97 S&P500 1/2 23.2±4.5 93.9±1.2 98.67±0.04 0.976
90-97 FTSE 0 -499.1±46.9 -1109.9±19 98.44±0.04 0.951
90-97 FTSE 1/3 -1310±86 1633.3±40.9 99.51±0.08 0.948
90-97 FTSE 1/2 -189.8±66.3 770.6±22.3 00.10±0.10 0.948
holds true where λ = exp (ω/2pi) and tn, tn+1 are successive maxima or
minima days (Table 3). The results [16] readily show that the examined
stock market indices well follow a logarithmic law divergence. It should be
noted that toscc and t
div
c are extremal dates since the index should necessarily
fall down before it reaches infinity. Moreover for both 1980-87 and 1990-97
period cases, it is found that the value of λ seems to be almost constant,
(Table 3), corresponding to ω ≃ 6. An analysis along similar lines of thought,
though emphasizing the no-divergence was discussed for the Nikkei [34,35]
and NASDAQ April 2000 crash [36].
3.2 During
First consider that a crash can occur under four different conditions, and
be listed in four categories, i.e. PMP, PMM, MMP, MMM, where M and P
indicate an index variation from one day to another. The middle variation
represents the crash amplitude. This allows for mini and maxi crashes. For
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Table 3. The λ and toscc values obtained for three indices following the methodology
explained in the text. The real rupture point of Oct. 19, 1987 is tc=87.79, and that
of Oct. 24, 97 is tc=97.81
Period 80-87 90-97
Index Dow S&P500 FTSE Dow S&P500 FTSE
λ 2.382±0.123 2.528±0.127 2.365±0.137 2.278±0.045 2.549±0.163 2.3745±0.054
toscc 87.91±0.10 87.88±0.07 87.87±0.10 97.89±0.06 97.85±0.08 97.85±0.05
this report consider the DAX variations between Oct. 1, 1959 and Dec. 30,
1998. In Figs. 1(a-d) we show the DAX partial distribution of fluctuations
(pdf) resulting from distinguishing such categories. The pdf’s have fat tails
far from a Gaussian distribution and scale as a power law with exponent µ,
P (g(i)) ∼ g(i)−µ, where g(i) = log(y(i+1)/y(i)) and y(i) denotes the signal.
Approximate values of the µ exponent are given in Table 4. The nine most
drastic crashes in each category are shown in Table 5 according to the value
of g(i) = log(y(i+1))−log(y(i)), together with the corresponding day. Notice
that the case studied by Lillo et al. [14], occurring on Aug. 31, 1998 is not
included among these 36 crashes.
Table 4. The µ exponent of the pdf tail’s power law dependence, the mean spectral
exponent β and the corresponding mean fractal dimension D for the DAX 600 day
long recovery signals after the crash for each crash category, i.e. PMP, PMM, MMP
and MMM of the DAX between Oct. 01, 1959 and Dec. 30, 1998.
case µ < β > < D >
PMP 2.76±0.12 1.70±0.38 1.65±0.38
PMM 2.76±0.19 1.79±0.30 1.60±0.30
MMP 2.85±0.17 1.60±0.36 1.70±0.36
MMM 2.83±0.23 1.68±0.35 1.66±0.35
3.3 After
To study the index evolution after the crash we construct an evolution signal
(Fig. 2 (a-d)) that is the difference between the DAX value signal at each
day y(i) and the DAX value at the crash day y0 for the 36 cases of interest
reported in Table 5. For most of the crashes, i.e. all crashes that occur before
Aug. 06, 1996, the evolution signal is 600 day long. However, for crashes that
occur after Aug. 6, 96, e.g. less than 600 days before the last day of this
study, the evolution signal is shorter, as for example the Oct. 01, 98 MMM
case in Fig. 2d. There are 3 short cases in each category.
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Fig. 1. The distribution of the fluctuations of (a) PMP, (b) PMM, (c) MMP, and
(d) MMM, as compared to the Gaussian distribution for the DAX between Oct. 1,
1959 to Dec. 30, 1998. Dotted lines correspond to a Gaussian fit to the central part
of the distributions
Notice that recovery can be slow. The PMP and PMM cases need of the
order of thirty days before having a positive y(i) - y0 value. The situation
is more complicated for the MMP and MMM cases. To see if some periodic
fluctuation occurs after the crash, the power spectrum of the DAX has been
studied for the 600 day long signals, i.e. for 24 cases. The power spectrum
corresponding to the major crash in each category is given in Figs. 3 (a-d).
Note the high-frequency log-periodic oscillation regime of the power spectrum
for the strongest MMM case that occurs on Oct. 19, 1987 on Fig. 3 d.
To estimate the behavior of the DAX index evolution signal post PMP,
PMM, MMP, MMM crashes it is of interest to relate each spectral exponent
β to the fractal dimension D of the signal through [37]
D = E +
3− β
2
, (4)
where E is the Euclidian dimension. The values of the averaged β and aver-
aged fractal dimension D are reported in Table 4.
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Table 5. The nine strongest crashes in each PMP, PMM, MMP and MMM category
listed in decreasing order strength measured by the value of g(i) = log(y(i+ 1))−
log(y(i)) for DAX between Oct. 1, 1959 and Dec. 30, 1998
PMP PMM MMP MMM
# of cases = 960 # of cases = 1247 # of cases = 1247 # of cases = 1360
date g(i) date g(i) date g(i) date g(i)
1. Oct 26, 87 -0.080 Oct 28, 87 -0.070 Oct 16, 89 -0.137 Oct 19, 87 -0.099
2. Oct 22, 87 -0.069 Oct 27, 97 -0.043 Aug 19, 91 -0.099 Sep 10, 98 -0.060
3. Jan 04, 88 -0.058 Aug 22, 97 -0.040 Oct 28, 97 -0.084 Oct 01, 98 -0.057
4. Mar 06, 61 -0.056 Sep 17, 98 -0.040 May 29, 62 -0.075 Nov 09, 87 -0.053
5. Jul 07, 86 -0.053 Dec 28, 87 -0.039 Nov 10, 87 -0.068 Dec 01, 98 -0.049
6. Oct 23, 97 -0.048 Jan 11, 88 -0.036 Oct 02, 98 -0.065 May 28, 62 -0.042
7. Dec 06, 96 -0.041 Oct 22, 62 -0.035 Aug 21, 98 -0.061 Jan 14, 91 -0.040
8. Apr 01, 97 -0.040 Nov 22, 73 -0.034 Aug 06, 90 -0.056 Oct 05, 92 -0.037
9. Jan 21, 74 -0.036 Aug 17, 62 -0.032 Mar 13, 74 -0.055 Aug 17, 90 -0.036
4 Predictability and remedies for a conclusion
Let us assume for the following arguments that one can discuss stock market
crashes in terms of physical model considerations. Moreover, let us admit that
signals can be treated as above, in terms of power laws, and oscillations. In so
doing we use the framework which has been useful in analyzing the avalanche
problem for sand piles in the Appendix. Let us wonder whether these con-
siderations, and analogies can suggest remedies in order to control or even
avoid crashes. It is easily argued that remedies can be either self-remedies
or due to external fields. At thermodynamic phase transitions, impurities, or
external fields can shift the critical temperature, and reduce the divergence
of thermodynamic properties. Let us disregard here the case of external field,
though several authors might consider that in some economies such fields are
relevant, or more necessary than self-corrections.
Several variables, or parameters, are to be considered : (i) the time scale,
or frequency ω, (ii) the amplitudes of the signal Ai, (iii) the dimensionality
of the system, (iv) the connectivity λ of the lattice. The amplitude is related
to the ”amount of sand” or volume exchanged during transactions, while the
connectivity is related to gradient of trades, which is somewhat similar to the
sand ”angle of repose”.
First it is absolutely clear that if the sand flux is large, an avalanche will be
very likely, and disordered. This can be seen to be analogous to the retention
of orders on a market, and to the effect of breakers [38]. Contrary to reducing,
stopping the avalanche effect, breakers are in fact accelerating the process.
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Aug  17, 90 
Fig. 2. The evolution of the nine strongest DAX crashes in (a) PMP, (b) PMM,
(c) MMP, and (d) MMM categories as listed in Table 5; y0 denotes the index value
at the ”origin of recovery”, i.e. the value of the signal at the closure time of the
crash day. The thick solid line corresponds to the average evolution of the recovery
signal in each category
One remedy is therefore to reduce the amount of sand, i.e. the number of
orders should decrease with time, and some delay should be imposed between
orders. This is similar to changing the angle of repose of the materials.
Another new remedy is hereby introduced, the connectivity. It has been
seen in the Appendix that when the connectivity increases the avalanche dis-
tribution is more spread out, the log-periodicity feature is not so pronounced.
Therefore it seems relevant that the number of actors on the market be in-
creased at crash time, together with the decrease in exchanged volume. Fur-
thermore the connectivity is a key ingredient in the spreading of information
on a market [39] and also leads to consider the effect of interacting agents and
herding models [40,41]. Notice that this effect is entirely contained in the os-
cillations which therefore smoothen the rate of divergence. It is of interest to
observe that the connectivity, in the stock market, is a rather small number,
ca. 6.0. To expect that the connectivity is a constant whatever the hierarchical
stage is of course a utopia, but this can be taken as a first approximation.
Another consideration pertains to the question whether a model and its
solution can be implemented, and if so if any crash can be avoided. Two
10 M. Ausloos, K. Ivanova and N. Vandewalle
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
f (days−1)
S(
f)
(a)
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
f (days−1)
S(
f)
(b)
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
f (days−1)
S(
f)
(c)
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
104
105
106
107
108
109
1010
f (days−1)
S(
f)
(d)
Fig. 3. The power spectrum of the 600 day DAX index evolution signal correspond-
ing to the major crash in each category (a) PMP : Oct. 26, 1987, (b) PMM : Oct.
28, 1987, (c) MMP : Oct. 16, 1989, and (d) MMM : Oct. 19, 1987.
comments are in order. First, one has to bear with statistical physics that as
long as hypotheses are fulfilled the class of transition is defined, and therefore
a crash will occur if the conditions are fulfilled. Next economic and speculative
considerations will always exist. Therefore crashes will always exist [42], -
except maybe under conditions/remedies outlined in the preceding section.
Whether there is an influence of a known theoretical model on a financial
event like a crash is exactly similar to wondering whether the equilibrium
market hypothesis holds true.
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Appendix
The Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld (BTW) [5] accumulation-dissipation pro-
cess model on regular lattices was extended to a sand pile version [43,44].
Recently, the BTW process was studied on a Sierpinski gasket of fractal di-
mension Df =
ln 3
ln 2
[45,46]. It has been shown that the avalanche dynamics is
characterized by a power law with a complex scaling exponent τ + iω with
ω = 2pi
ln 2
. This was understood as the result of the underlying Discrete Scale
Invariance (DSI) of the gasket, i.e. the lattice is translation invariant on a
log-scale [26]. It is possible to extend the study of the BTW model on other
(prefractal) Regular Sierpinski Carpets (RSC) by varying both the fractal
dimension Df as well as the connectivity of the lattice. In so doing we have
observed apparently connectivity-based corrections to power law scaling.
1 0-5
1 0-4
1 0-3
1 0-2
1 0-1
1 00
1 01
1 1 0 100 1000
P(
s)
s
Fig. 4. The size distribution of avalanches P (s) for the BTW model on fractal RSC
lattices having the same fractal dimension Df =
ln 6
ln 3
+ i 2pi
ln 3
. The generators of the
Sierpinski carpets are indicated
Four different RSC of generation n = 2 are illustrated in Fig. 4. They
are characterized by the same complex fractal dimension Df =
ln 6
ln 3
+ i 2pi
ln 3
but having different lacunarity, i.e. different measures of the heterogeneity
[47]. The RSC’s of Fig. 5 are characterized by different fractal dimensions
and connectivity, or ramification R. This quantity is defined as the minimum
number of bonds which should be cut in order to remove a macroscopic part
of the lattice. The RSC of Fig. 5a has an infinite ramification, though for all
others in Figs. 4-5, the ramification R is finite.
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Let each site j of a RSC be allowed to contain a finite number of states
or entities zj =
{
0, 1, 2, ..., zcj
}
, where zcj is hereby taken equal to R.
At each step of the BTW-like dynamical process [5], one lattice site j is
chosen at random and its content is updated following
zj → zj + 1, (5)
i.e. accumulating entities on the site j. However if zj ≥ z
c
j , the j site is
assumed to become unstable (or “active”) and to relax (in other words an
avalanche is initiated) according to the following rules
zj → zj − z
c
j (6)
zk → zk + 1 (7)
where k denotes the zcj nearest neighboring sites of j. The dissipation rule is
repeated t times until the system reaches a stable state with all lattice sites
m implied in the avalanche having zm < z
c
m. By definition, the size s of the
avalanche is the number of sites visited by the relaxation process after each
perturbation. The duration of the avalanche is t. Another (or the same) site
j is next chosen and the (5)-(7) process repeated. One should remark that
the borders of the square lattice on which the RSC is built play the role of
absorbing sites for the dissipative process [48].
1 0-6
1 0-5
1 0-4
1 0-3
1 0-2
1 0-1
1 00
1 01
1 1 0 100 1000
P(
s)
s
Fig. 5. The size distribution of avalanches P (s) for the BTW model on fractal RSC
lattices with high and low connectivity and various Df . The generators of the RSC
are indicated
In Figs. 4-5, the distribution of avalanche size P (s) is plotted for these
different RSC lattices, the generators being indicated in the margin. Since
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the generators have the same size 3 × 3, the imaginary part of Df is
2pi
ln 3
for
the illustrated lattices. About 106 avalanches have been counted in each P (s)
distribution, rescaled by some arbitrary factor for clarity. Different types of
behaviors can be observed ranging from jagged distributions with well defined
peaks and valleys to ”classic” smooth power law P (s) distributions. For most
distributions P (s) ∼ s−τ , expressing the scale invariance of the dynamics.
We have checked the power-law exponent (τ) as a function of the fractal
dimension of RSC lattices and have found that τ seems to be dependent of
the real part of the fractal dimension ℜ{Df}. Notice that for ℜ{Df} → 2,
τ = 1.25± 0.03.
In order to estimate τ , we have filtered the jagged curve P (s) distribu-
tion obtained on lattices of size n=3, 4, 5 and 6. As done in [45], we have
extrapolated the values of τ for n → ∞ in order to minimize finite-size ef-
fects. Nevertheless, error bars are large (about 10%) due to the presence of
the oscillations. We have observed significant deviations of τ from 1.25, i.e.
the d = 2 value. It seems that the real part of the fractal dimension of the
dissipative system is not the single parameter controlling the value of τ . Usu-
ally when the dimension of the RSC lattice has a finite imaginary part iω,
one1 can observe periodic structures in P (s)sτ with a period 2pi
ω
. At the bot-
tom of Fig. 5, there are huge peaks which are log-periodically spaced. These
oscillations (peaks) can be thought to originate from the DSI of the RSC
lattice as in [45], and to mimic those discussed in the main text for financial
indices. We have noticed that a finite value of the ramification R corresponds
to the largest amplitude of the oscillations. One should remark that previous
investigations [45,46] did not find huge oscillations nor sharp peaks. The au-
thors considered a Sierpinski gasket having loops in the structure as well as a
constant threshold zcj = 4 everywhere on the gasket. We emphasize that the
connectivity of the lattice is one of the most relevant parameters. Notice that
such log-periodic oscillations and linearly substructured peaks are observed
in the time distribution of avalanche durations P (t) as well.
References
1. Lauterbach B, Ben-Zion U (1993) Stock Market Crashes and Performance of
Circuit Breakers : Empirical Evidence, J Finance 48:1909-1925
2. Dupuis H (1997) Editorial. Trends Tendances 28:26
3. Vandewalle N, Ausloos M, Boveroux Ph, et al (1999) Visualizing the log-
periodic pattern before crashes. Eur J Phys B 9:355-359
4. Mantegna RN (1999) Hierarchical structure in financial markets. Eur J Phys
B 11:193-197
5. Bak P, Tang C and Wiesenfeld K (1987) Self-organized criticality: An expla-
nation of 1/f noise. Phys Rev Lett 59:381-384
6. http://www.historyhouse.com/stories/tulip.htm
1 D. Stauffer (private communication) considers that the displayed data is not
convincingly log-periodic though does not appear to be a set of random numbers.
14 M. Ausloos, K. Ivanova and N. Vandewalle
7. see : http://www.enlou.com/people/bio-lawj.htm
8. http://landow.stg.brown.edu/victorian/history/ssbubble.html
9. http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/6/0,5716,483221,00.html
10. Westfall R (1994) The Life of Isaac Newton. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge
11. http://mypage.direct.ca/r/rsavill/Thecrash.html
12. Bates DS (1991) The crash of ’87 : Was It Expected ? The Evidence from
Options Markets. J Finance 46:1009-1044
13. Lillo F, Mantegna RN (2000) Symmetry alteration of ensemble return distri-
bution in crash and rally days of financial markets. Eur J Phys B 15:603-606
14. Lillo F (2001) these proceedings
15. Vandewalle N, Boveroux Ph, Minguet A, et al (1998) The crash of October 1987
seen as a phase transition : amplitude and universality. Physica A 255:201-210
16. Vandewalle N, Ausloos M (1998) How the financial crash of Oct. 27, 1997 could
have been predicted. Eur J Phys B 4:139-141
17. Sornette D, Johansen A, Bouchaud JP (1996) Stock market crashes, precursors
and replicas. J Physique I (France) 6:167-175
18. Feigenbaum JA, Freund PGO (1996) Discrete scale invariance in stock markets
before crashes. Int J Mod Phys B 10:3737-3745
19. Feigenbaum JA, Freund PGO (1998) Discrete scale invariance and the ”second
black monday”. Mod Phys Lett B 12:57-60
20. Bouchaud J-Ph, Cont R (1998) A Langevin approach to stock market fluctua-
tions and crashes. Eur J Phys B 6:543-550
21. Gluzman S, Yukalov VI (1998) Booms and Crashes in Self-Similar Markets.
Mod Phys Lett B 12:575-588
22. Canessa E (2000) Stochastics Theory of Log-Periodic Pattern. J Phys A Math
Gen 33:9131-9140
23. Laloux L, Potters M, Cont R, et al (1998) Are financial crashes predictable?.
Europhys Lett 45:1-5
24. Johansen A, Ledoit O, Sornette D (1998) Crashes as critical points. cond-
mat/9810071 v2
25. Stanley HE (1971) Phase transitions and critical phenomena. Clarendon Press,
London
26. Sornette D (1998) Discrete-scale invariance and complex dimensions. Phys Rep
297:239-270
27. Johansen A, Sornette D, Ledoit O (1999) Predicting financial crashes using
discrete scale invariance. J Risk 1:5-32
28. Canessa E (2001) Economics mapping to the renormalization group scaling of
stock markets. Eur J Phys B (in press)
29. MacDonald JR, Ausloos M (1997) Analysis of TbZn resistivity temperature
derivative above the Curie point using singular fitting equations. Physica A
242:150-160
30. Ausloos M, Vandewalle N, Boveroux Ph, et al (1999) Applications of Statistical
Physics to Economic and Financial Topics. Physica A 274:229-240
31. Ausloos M, Vandewalle N, Ivanova K (2000) Time is Money. In: M Planat, (Ed)
Noise, Oscillators and Algebraic Randomness. Springer, Berlin pp 156-171
32. Ausloos M (2000) Statistical Physics in Foreign Exchange Currency and Stock
Markets. Physica A 285:48-65
33. Brezin E, LeGuillou JC, Zinn-Justin J (1974) Asymptotic behavior of the spin-
spin correlation function in a field and below Tc. Phys Rev Lett 32:473-475
Crashes : symptoms, diagnoses and remedies 15
34. Johansen A, Sornette D, (1999) Financial ”anti-bubbles”: log-periodicity in
gold and Nikkei collapses. Int J Mod Phys C 10:563-575
35. Stauffer D, Pandey RB (2000) Search for log-periodic oscillations in stock mar-
ket simulations. Int J Theor Appl Finance 3:479-482
36. Johansen A, Sornette D, (2000) The NASDAQ crash of April 2000: Yet another
example of log-periodicity in a speculative bubble ending in a crash. Eur J Phys
B 17:319-328
37. Schroeder M (1991) Fractals, Chaos, Power Laws. Freeman, New York
38. Grassia PS (2000) Delay, feedback and quenching in financial markets. Eur J
Phys B 17:347-362
39. Huang Z-F (2000) Self-organized model for information spread in financial mar-
kets. Eur J Phys B 16:379-385
40. Kaizoji T (2000) Speculative bubbles and crashes in stock markets : an inter-
acting agent model of speculative activity. Physica A 287:493-506
41. D’Hulst R, Rodgers GJ (2000) Democracy versus dictatorship in self-organized
models of financial markets. Physica A 280:554-565
42. Dean J, Milovanov T (2000) A model of stock market bubble under uncertain
fundamentals. Int J Theor Appl Finance 3:599
43. Bak P, Tang C, Wiesenfeld K (1988) Self-organized criticality. Phys Rev A
38:364-374
44. Zhang YC (1989) Scaling theory of self-organized criticality. Phys Rev Lett
63:470-473
45. Kutnjak-Urbanc B, Zapperi S, Milosevic S, et al (1996) Sandpile model on the
Sierpinski gasket fractal. Phys Rev E 54:272-277
46. Daerden F, Vanderzande C (1998) Sandpiles on a Sierpinski gasket. Physica A
256:533-546
47. Gefen Y, Aharony A, Mandelbrot BB (1983) Phase transitions on fractals. I.
Quasi-linear lattices. J Phys A 16:1267-1278
48. Christensen K, Olami Z (1993) Sandpile models with and without an underlying
spatial structure. Phys Rev E 48:3361-3372
